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Chapter
Can Nonlinear Water Pricing Help
to Mitigate Drought Effects in
Temperate Countries?
Jean-Philippe Terreaux and Mabel Tidball
Abstract
The notion of drought is most often associated with the aridity of landscapes and
vegetation. But a green landscape can hide a frequent imbalance between water
availability and the quantity necessary to maintain rivers in a suitable state, to
satisfy different water needs. This is the case, for example, in the French region
called New Aquitaine. Regularly, "drought" crisis committees are set up there to
limit water use through administrative constraints, which is technically difficult
and costly for many, and with an overall unsatisfactory situation from rural areas to
the coast. But in summer, water consumption is mainly due to irrigation. Some
water resource managers have consequently set up an original non-linear water
pricing system for irrigation to achieve several objectives: above all, to limit water
consumption in order to respect a minimum flow rate in rivers, to anticipate water
supply-demand imbalances before agricultural plantations are made, to allocate
water to the users who value it best, to recover water supply costs, to be transparent
and sufficiently simple in its application to be acceptable. In this chapter, we
propose to describe one of such original pricing systems, as well as some of its main
mathematical properties and its practical interests.
Keywords: drought, irrigation, nonlinear pricing, environment,
mathematical economics
1. The problem of chronic droughts in France
Economic and trade developments and the growth of the world’s population are
leading to an increasing exploitation of natural resources. In addition, this global
evolution is accompanied by changes in the economic, social, and environmental
context (climate change and spread of species becoming invasive), making more
uncertain the context in which different professions work. For example, the
farmers now face a multiplicity of new climatic, market, and biotic risks. In this
context, the implementation of measures to secure various resources, including
water, helps to mitigate the negative effects of these developments. More generally,
various tools to combat hazards have been put in place at the individual level:
insurance or other risk pooling systems, diversification, etc.
But with regard to water resources, even in some areas where they were once
considered abundant, the limits of their exploitation may have been reached.
And because property rights over these resources are often poorly established,
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the “tragedy of the commons” (see [1]) is repeated. For example, in the agricultural
sector, everyone is encouraged to make the most of available water in their own
interest, while well-designed coordination of the different uses would improve
everyone’s well-being or economic performance (see, for example, [2]).
The problems thus created have repercussions on the agricultural activity itself,
which can no longer rely on a sufficient supply of water, and on the community in
general: on the environmental level (e.g., river dewatering), on the economic level
(impact on downstream sectors, such as shellfish farming or tourism, as the European
Coastal project shows, see [3]), or on the social level with farmers quite often being
accused of many wrongdoings. This is also one of the reasons for the implementation
at European Union level of the Water Framework Directive (see e.g., [4]).
Thus, a green landscape such as those frequent in the French region of New
Aquitaine can hide recurrent problems of drought, with very frequent crises in
areas such as the Charente “département.” As a result, the public authorities regu-
larly intervene, imposing different constraints to farmers or to their Water User
Associations (WUA) in charge of the resource management (e.g., restrictions on
irrigation, while crops are in place) to allocate the water shortage. The situation is
then penalizing for everyone, and especially for farmers, who too often cannot
adequately grow the crops in which they have invested. And it ultimately leads to a
perfectible situation on each of the three pillars of a sustainable development:
economic, social, and environmental.
This situation is well documented and explained in game theory, particularly in
the context of the “prisoner’s dilemma” (see [5]). But it gives few solutions, except
to seek coordination between stakeholders. The “tragedy of the commons” can
generally be resolved by privatizing the resource, but in France and in many coun-
tries, this solution cannot be applied to the water resource for legal reasons (see, for
example, [6] for their developments on this subject). This is what opponents of
water storage in reservoirs remind us, arguing that the resource must benefit all
uses and that it cannot be used by a single sector of the economy.
On the other hand, at some short distance from this Charente département, and
still in the New Aquitaine Region, an original attempt at water pricing has been
made in order to try to better coordinate farmers’ actions, by anticipating as well as
possible the annual imbalances between water supply and demand. The objective is
thus to make the best use of public information (the water level in rivers, ground-
water or reservoirs, climatic conditions, market conditions, etc.) and also private
information (importance for farmers of securing their water supply, linked, for
example, to their product sales contracts, their debt level, or more simply their risk
aversion), but without being inquisitorial (by making them reveal only what is
important for the water resource management). Of course, this does not guarantee
that there will be no crisis, but it does make it possible to anticipate them as well as
possible and to resolve a majority of possible conflicts well before the plots are
planted, that is, before the distribution of the shortage has any serious conse-
quences. This too gives the farmers the possibility to change their culture choices in
order to adapt them more precisely to the available water.
The idea, developed by the irrigators of the Compagnie d’Aménagement des
Eaux des Deux-Sèvres (CAEDS), is to base the price of irrigation water paid each
year on two variables: the quantity of water reserved by each farmer (before
planting) and the quantity actually consumed. We show here that the pricing
formula used encourages the farmer to subscribe a quantity directly related to what
he expects to consume (which makes it possible to deduce very quickly what each
farmer plans to consume and the total consumption, which makes it easier, as we
saw, to resolve possible conflicts, as well as consequently to respect more easily the
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minimum flow rates in the nearby rivers). Finally, we show that it is possible to
modify the volumes consumed globally by varying the parameters.
In a way, by creating value not only from the water resources but also simulta-
neously from public and private information, this makes it easier to resolve conflicts
of use, by reducing the frequency of crises. This approach combines mechanism
design, game theory, and nonlinear pricing results.
In the rest of this chapter, we give a very short overview of some of the literature
on irrigation water resource pricing (see [7] for some aspects), as well as on
nonlinear pricing (see [8]). Then we develop a mathematical model to show differ-
ent properties of this pricing formula and in particular why volume subscription
by farmers makes it possible to anticipate their consumption.
2. Literature review: agricultural water economics
and nonlinear pricing
In France, after having built many individual or collective dams in order to
increase water-storage capacity (“supply management”), efforts are currently
focused on “demand management,” that is, the use of less irrigation water for the
same production and the search for more efficient alternatives for sharing water
among the different uses while trying to find more efficient water pricing schemes
(see [9]). The problem is similar in other parts of the world (see, e.g., [10] for China).
The aims of water management are multiple and may sometimes be understood
as contradictory ([11]): the first one is to allocate water to users who valorize it at
the best (efficiency). The second is to guarantee an access to this essential good to
everybody and to be acceptable in order to be applied (equity). Moreover, as
mentioned in [12], it may be a tool to redistribute public investment benefits. The
third is to recover costs induced by water extraction/distribution/use. The fourth is
to be transparent and simple enough to be understandable, and it is clear that a two
variable tariff, as the one presented here, is quite acceptable as shown by the fact
that it was implemented in the CAEDS area. Another nonlinear pricing scheme is
also established in the Compagnie d’Aménagement des Coteaux de Gascogne area in
the southwest of France and is compared in [13] and [14] to the one presented here
as regards the agricultural production, the farmers revenue, and the water quantity
used for irrigation in accordance with the climatic conditions.
Generally speaking, water pricing practices can be classified in two families:
volumetric and non-volumetric methods. Volumetric methods rely on the volume
and require metered water facility (see [15] or [16], for examples of the implemen-
tation of a volumetric pricing system). Non-volumetric methods are based on
output/input other than water, for example, in the agricultural sector as per area
pricing (see [17]). The last methods are widespread because of their simplicity, but
they do not encourage saving water.
When using volumetric methods, water can be priced in three main ways. The
price can be either constant whatever the level of consumed water or defined “per
block”: the cost per additional consumed unit varies when the consumption reaches
some given thresholds. The marginal pricing can either increase with the level of
consumption (increasing block tariff) or decrease (declining block rate). The appli-
cation of such a pricing is studied for domestic water use, for example, in [18].
The increasing block tariffs (IBT) can be used to impose conservation incentives
on some target group of large users. Customers facing the higher prices at the
margin will, in theory, use less water than they would under the uniform pricing;
customers facing lower prices at the margin will use more. The expectation is that
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demand in the high blocks will be more elastic than demand in the low blocks,
resulting in a net decrease in water use when compared to a uniform pricing.
Although there is widespread consensus that IBT have many advantages, this type
of tariff still deserves more careful examination since an incorrect structure of the
IBTs leads to several shortcomings as argued in [19]. Some of them are difficulties to
set the initial block; mismatch between prices and marginal costs; conflict between
revenue sufficiency and economic efficiency; absence of simplicity, transparency,
and implementation; incapacity of solving shared connections; etc.
The decreasing block tariff (DBT) is, unlike the preceding one, in accordance
with the proposition that high-value goods “should” be bought at higher price than
low-value goods. Water will be first purchased for uses with high values and then
only for uses which will lead to less welfare increases. Concerning equity, this type
of tariff is “not advisable”. “The consumers who acquire smaller amounts of the
good and/or service because of their low incomes would be bearing a higher price
than those who can afford to consume greater amounts” (see [20]). But it can be
justified in the following circumstances:
• When users have very different levels of consumption. A consumer hundred
times bigger than the average consumer does not create costs hundred times
higher, because there is only one pipe line, one billing process, etc. And, since
cost per volume is lower with large consumers, it is justifiable to propose DBT
in the case of heterogeneous users.
• In order to incite users to stay in the WUA: as we have explained above, IBT
(e.g., see [21]) might encourage users who have access to alternative water
sources to quit (partly at least) the network, stopping to contribute to the
recovery of the costs. This can lead to cost recovery problems for the water
supplier and besides might lead to negative environmental consequences. DBT
does not have this negative incentive.
A two-part tariff combines a fixed and a volumetric rate (or a mix of fixed and
variable elements). “Under this system, consumers must pay an entry charge that
entitles them to consume the good. Subsequently they will pay an additional smaller
amount for each extra unit consumed.” “Two-part tariff is easy to explain and easy
to understand” is mentioned in [20]. But in practice, it fails to reach the efficiency
objective and suffer from the fact that it does not allow to reveal information on
water demand, which may be at the origin of sudden discrepancy between water
supply and demand.
In the following sections, we study the properties of a different pricing struc-
ture, in which farmers make a water reservation (e.g., during wet period or before
planting) and then pay a water bill which is an increasing function of water reser-
vation and of real water consumption (e.g., during dry period or during peak
vegetation). This allows the WUA manager to forecast disequilibrium between
water demand and supply. The water pricing is parameterized, in order to adapt the
price to the actual WUA situation and to the available water supply.
3. The model
3.1 Notations
We consider a WUA composed of n farmers and which provides them irrigation
water at a cost. Each farmer i has a production function we note hi(Ci) which is a
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function of the volume Ci of the water he consumes. This production function is
private information, known only by the farmer himself.
Each year, each farmer firstly reserves a water volume Si, for example, before
choosing his planting and then consumes another volume Ci for the field irrigation,
Ci being either inferior or superior to Si. The pricing formula is designed in order to
take into account these two variables and to display some properties.
The notations we use are the following:
• B is the total water user association expenses.
• D is proportional to B: D = λB, with a constant λ>0.
• Si is the volume reserved by agent i during the considered year.
• Ci is the volume consumed by agent i during the same year.
• hi(Ci) is agent i’ s production function, which depends on the consumed
water Ci.
• F ¼ F Si;Cið Þ is the sum agent i must pay (his water bill).
For each agent i, the pricing formula is
F Si;Cið Þ ¼ D aSi þ 1 að Þ
Cimax Ci; bSið Þ
Si
 
(1)
with a ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ [0, 1].
The pricing scheme is a common knowledge for all farmers and is the same for
all of them. Parameter a represents a kind of sharing of the price between, on the
first hand, the reservation part and, on the other hand, the consumption part. As
D = λB, the role of parameter λ is to ensure a balanced budget, under the financial
conditions of the WUA, for example, by adjusting the value of this parameter by
trial and error year after year, if a temporary budget imbalance is permissible.
We will return to this point in Section 3.3, examining in particular the case where
a minimum of revenue each year is required. The role of parameter b is to incite to
reserve at least the forecasted consumption divided by b. For a Si given, when
Ci > bSi, the C
2
i which appears in the pricing formula incites to diminish water
consumption.
A deterministic approach, without acquisition of information between the res-
ervation date and the consumption date, is sufficient in order to study some of the
properties of this pricing. Of course other properties directly linked to stochastic
variables (as the climate) cannot be studied here and are the object of further
researches.
But we must note that since Ci depends on Si, we must take this relationship into
account in optimizing the volumes reserved and consumed by the farmer i.
3.2 The maximization problem of farmer i
When choosing the values of his control variables Si and Ci, the farmer must
decide of the optimal value of Ci knowing the optimal value of Si previously
announced. Therefore each farmer must solve
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max
Si
max
Ci
hi Cið Þ  F Si;Cið Þð Þ
 
(2)
where the production function of farmer i, hi, is an increasing and concave
function.
3.2.1 The maximization problem in Ci
We note G Si;Cið Þ ¼ hi Cið Þ  F Si;Cið Þ, and we calculate the solution of the
maximization of G Si;Cið Þ as a function of Ci. We have
∂Gi Si;Cið Þ
∂Ci
¼
h0i Cið Þ  2 1 að ÞD
Ci
Si
if bSi <Ci
h0i Cið Þ  1 að ÞbD if bSi >Ci
8<
: (3)
• For bSi <Ci, we note C

i Sið Þ the solution in Ci of
h0i Cið Þ ¼ 2 1 að ÞD
Ci
Si
(4)
With a simple derivation of this last equation, it is easy to see that
C0i Sið Þ ¼
2 1 að ÞDCi
2 1 að ÞDSi  h
0 0
Cið ÞS
2
i
>0 (5)
Therefore C
0
i Sið Þ is an increasing function of Si.
We remark by the way that when bSi <Ci, we have
2 1 að ÞD
Ci
Si
> 2 1 að ÞbD> 1 að ÞbD (6)
• For bSi >Ci, we call C
þ
i the solution in Ci of
h0i Cið Þ ¼ 1 að ÞbD (7)
We note that this solution does not depend on Si.
The preceding remark, the concavity of hi, and the definition in (4) and (7) of
Ci and of C
þ
i imply that
Ci Sið Þ<C
þ
i (8)
We can easily deduce that the optimal solution Csoli of (2) for Si given depends on
the relative positions of Ci Sið Þ<C
þ
i and of bSi:
Csoli ¼
Ci ðSiÞ  if   Si <C

i ðSiÞ=b 
bSi        if   C

i ðSiÞ=b ≤  Si ≤C
þ
i =b
Cþi         if   Si >C
þ
i =b
8><
>: (9)
Note that this formula gives a relation Csoli Sið Þ that depends on the parameters of
the regulator and of the profit function hi of farmer i. When starting from small Si,
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Csoli Sið Þ is first an increasing function of Si, then it is a linear function in Si, and
finally it is a constant.
3.2.2 The maximization problem in Si
When solving the maximization of our problem in Si, knowing the optimal value
Ci, which is generally, as we saw, a function of Si, we must consider the relation
between these two variables.
• If Si <C

i Sið Þ=b, we must solve
max
Si

hi

Ci ðSiÞ

 F

Si, C

i ðSiÞ

(10)
and the first-order condition gives
h0i C

i ðSiÞ
 	
C0i ðSiÞ ¼ D aþ ð1 aÞ
2Ci ðSiÞC
0
i ðSiÞSi 

Ci ðSiÞ
2
S2i
2
64
3
75 (11)
• If  Ci Sið Þ=b≤ Si ≤C
þ
i =b we must solve
max
Si
hi bSið Þ D aSi þ 1 að Þb
2Si
 	 	
(12)
for which the first-order condition is
bh0i bSið Þ ¼ D aþ 1 að Þb
2
  (13)
• and if Si >C
þ
i =b the maximization problem is:
max
Si

hiðC
þ
i Þ  FðSi, C
þ
i Þ

(14)
that does not have a solution, which means that the farmer will at least consume
bSi (as consuming less would decrease his production without decreasing his water
bill; in other words we have bSi ≤ Ci).
To obtain the optimal solution of our problem in Si, we must analyze the admis-
sibility of solutions of (11) and (13).
Theorem
The optimal strategy of farmer i is
1/Si ¼ Ci
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 að Þ=a
p
if 0< b
2
1þb2
< a< 1, where Ci is the solution of
h0i Cið Þ ¼ 2D
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a 1 að Þ
p
(15)
2/Si ¼ Ci=b if 0< a< b
2
1þb2
< 1, where Ci is the solution of
h0i Cið Þ ¼
D aþ 1 að Þb2
 	
b
(16)
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Proof of the theorem
We start by introducing a Lemma.
Lemma
max
Si
max
Ci
hi Cið Þ  F Si;Cið Þð Þ
 
¼ max
Si,Ci
hi Cið Þ  F Si;Cið Þ½  (17)
Proof of the Lemma
In Section 3.2.1 of this chapter, we have shown that the solution of
max
Si
max
Ci
hi Cið Þ  F Si;Cið Þð Þ
 
(18)
is given either if bSi = Ci (border solution) by the maximization in Si of G Si;Cið Þ
or if bSi < Ci (interior solution) by h
0
i Cið Þ ¼ 2 1 að ÞD
Ci
Si
(Eq. (4)).
Now if we solve the problem
max
Si,Ci
hi Cið Þ  F Si;Cið Þ½  (19)
its interior solution (with bSi < Ci), knowing that (the first equivalence
being due to the fact that G(Si,Ci) depends on Si only through F(Si,Ci) and
not through hi)
∂G Si;Cið Þ
∂Si
¼ 0 ⇔
∂F Si;Cið Þ
∂Si
¼ 0 ⇔ Si ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 a
a
r
 Ci and b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 a
a
r
< 1 (20)
is given by
∂G Si;Cið Þ
∂Si
¼ 0 ⇔ h0 Cið Þ ¼ 2 1 að ÞD
Ci
Si
(21)
which coincides with (4). Replacing this equation in (11), we obtain
2 1 að ÞD
Ci
Si
C0i ¼ D aþ
1 að Þ2CiC
0
i
Si
 1 að Þ
C2i
S2i
 !
(22)
Simplifying we find Eq. (18) so that the interior solution coincides with the
solution of (2). The border solutions are also the same (i.e., bSi = Ci) for (2) and for
(19). Finally, both solutions are the same.
We now return to the demonstration of the Theorem itself. Thanks to the
Lemma, we can now compute the solution of (2), by computing the solution of
max
Si,Ci
hi Cið Þ  F Si;Cið Þ½  (23)
• If bSi <Ci,
then (23) can be written as
max
Si,Ci
hi Cið Þ D aSi þ 1 að Þ
C2i
Si
  
(24)
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And the first order conditions give
a=
∂ hi Cið Þ D aSi þ 1 að Þ
C2i
Si
 h i
∂Si
¼ a
1 að ÞC2i
S2i
¼ 0 (25)
which is equivalent to
Si ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 a
a
r
Ci (26)
We remark that this implies, as bSi <Ci, that
b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 a
a
r
< 1 (27)
and
b=
∂ hi Cið Þ D aSi þ 1 að Þ
C2i
Si
 h i
∂Ci
¼ h0 Cið Þ D
1 að Þ2Ci
Si
¼ 0 (28)
which is equivalent to
h0 Cið Þ ¼ 2D
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a 1 að Þ
p
(29)
• If bSi ≥Ci,
then (23) can be written as
max
Si,Ci
hi Cið Þ D aSi þ 1 að ÞbCið Þð Þ þ μ bSi  Cið Þ (30)
with μ the dual variable associated to the constraint bSi ≥Ci.
The first-order conditions give here:
a=
∂ hi Cið Þ D aSi þ 1 að ÞbCið Þ þ μ bSi  Cið Þ½ 
∂Si
¼ Daþ μb ¼ 0 (31)
and
b=
∂ hi Cið Þ D aSi þ 1 að ÞbCið Þ þ μ bSi  Cið Þ½ 
∂Ci
¼ h0 Cið Þ D 1 að Þb μ ¼ 0 (32)
The solution of these equations is.
Ci ¼ bSi, μ ¼
Da
b
>0 and h0 Cið Þ ¼ D 1 að Þbþ
a
b
h i
¼ D
1 að Þb2 þ a
b
" #
(33)
Remark 1
The optimal solution is a continuous function of parameters a and b. Moreover,
the regulator can choose parameters a and b in order to enforce an interior solution
or a border solution.
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Remark 2
Note that in 2/ of the theorem
lim
b!0
D aþ 1 að Þb2
 	
b
 !
¼ ∞ (34)
If we choose b small enough and therefore a small enough to remain in case
2/, (20) incites the farmers to use less water, that is, Ci ! 0 when b ! 0. But in
general we cannot draw any conclusion on the value of Si.
In conclusion the WUA manager may use these two parameters a and b in order
to decrease the water consumption, but he cannot make water decrease at discretion
since as in our example he might decrease also the reserved volume and at the end
the budget equilibrium would not be satisfied.
Note also that in 1/ of the Theorem, we cannot make the consumption Ci decrease
at will, since the maximum value of h0i Cið Þ is equal to D according to Eq. (15).
Figure 1 shows how Si must be tightly correlated to Ci by the farmer in order to
obtain a good remuneration Gi Si;Cið Þ ¼ hi Cið Þ  F Si;Cið Þfor his activities. (Numeri-
cally, it is computed with the following functions and values: hi Cið Þ ¼ 2:C
0:5
i ; a = 1/3;
b = 0.7; D = 2; negative values have been replaced by 0). A slight deviation from the
optimum value of Si at the reservation time, and of the optimal consumption Ci,
once Si is chosen, will diminish considerably the value of the gain G. This means
that from the value of Si, the WUA manager is able to predict accurately the level of
the water demand.
3.3 The budget equilibrium constraint
In this section, we study the conditions in which the budget equilibrium may be
obtained, or in other terms, in which
Figure 1.
Representation of G(Ci, Si) as a function of Ci and of Si. Numerical values: see text.
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∑iF Si;Cið Þ ¼ B (35)
The WUA manager may choose parameters a and b in such a way that
1/ either 0< b
2
1þb2
< a< 1 and then Si ¼ Ci
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 að Þ=a
p
according to the Theorem;
we know then that
Ci ¼ h
0
i

 1
2D
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a 1 að Þ
p 
≕ gi 2D
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a 1 að Þ
p 
(36)
and the budget equilibrium constraint (35) must be written as
2λB
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 að Þ=a
p
∑iCi ¼ 2λB
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 að Þ=a
p
∑igi 2λB
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a 1 að Þ
p 
¼ B (37)
which gives
2λ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 að Þ=a
p
∑igi 2λB
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a 1 að Þ
p 
¼ 1 (38)
If we assume in order to facilitate the presentation of the demonstration that
hi Cið Þ ¼
C
αi
i
αi
, with 0< αi < 1,which reminds us of a Cobb–Douglas production func-
tion, this last equation becomes
f λð Þ≕ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 að Þ=a
p
∑iλ
αi
αi1Mi ¼ 1 (39)
whereMi≕ 2B
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a 1 að Þ
p  αi
αi1 (40)
Noting that since αi
αi1
<0, we have limλ!0 f λð Þ ¼ þ∞ and also limλ!∞ f λð Þ ¼ 0.
As f 0 λð Þ<0, we deduce that there exists a unique λ which verifies (39).
2/ or 0< a< b
2
1þb2
< 1 and then bSi ¼ Ci, according to the Theorem.
Previously we showed that
Ci ¼ h
0
i

 1 D aþ 1 að Þb2 	
b
 !
≕ ki
D aþ 1 að Þb2
 	
b
 !
(41)
Assuming here too that hi Cið Þ ¼
C
αi
i
αi
, the budget equilibrium constraint (39) can
be written as
g λð Þ≕ A∑iλ
αi
αi1Ni ¼ 1 (42)
with A≕
D aþ 1að Þb2ð Þ
b and Ni≕ BAð Þ
1
αi1, and we obtain the same conclusion as in
1/.
So, once parameters a and b are chosen for considerations of water savings, the
WUA manager can force the system to be in budgetary equilibrium with the choice
of the parameter λ value. Of course, not knowing the true value of αiparameters, or
more generally ignoring the precise form of the hi(Ci) functions, he will not be able
to compute directly the optimal value of λ, but the existence result on a unique λ
value and the monotonicity of f(λ) and of g(λ) allows him to find the correct value
by trials and errors.
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4. Conclusion
We have shown here how it is possible with a pricing system based on two
variables, reservation and consumption, for the WUA manager to get enough
information in order to anticipate any disequilibrium between water demand and
supply, when it is always possible to change the choice of the cultures. Moreover
changing the parameters allows theWUAmanager to modify the volume consumed
by the farmers, which is especially useful when searching a decrease of the water
consumption. Translated in a two-entry table, this method is simple enough to be
understood by each farmer and quite acceptable since associating the pursuit of
fairness, efficiency, and adaptability.
At last, with a judicious choice of the value for the parameters, it is possible to
incite the farmers to be more or less acute in the choice of their reservation and
consumption values. This pricing system should therefore allow a more efficient use
of the water resource by the farmers, by the way decreasing the constraints on other
economic sectors and on the environment.
The need for a better management of irrigation water is now recognized, and
the potentialities of original pricing systems (see, for example, [22]) are confirmed
by many work in economics, carried out in different contexts such as those
presented by [23] in semi-arid climates, or [24], and [25] in different European
countries.
Further researches are nevertheless needed to study how such a system keeps
or increases its advantages when we take into account the fact that in many
countries the water supply may be stochastic (see, for example, [26]). It would
also be important to study the strategic interactions between farmers, as well as the
different inter-annual dynamics that can be put in place, in order to facilitate the
development of agricultural activities, while still under budgetary constraint (see
[27]). In addition, the acquisition of information between the reservation (during
the wet vegetation season) and the peak consumption (during the dry vegetation
season) can be sequential. Taking this into account can lead to an even better
valorization of the water resources, through the implementation of an adapted
pricing policy. This leads to other refinements which are the aim of other present
researches.
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